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INTRODUCTION:

Imagine a place where the attorneys charged with defending the vast
majority of those accused of a crime were detrimentally reliant on fees
gathered from the convictions of those accused. 1 Now imagine another
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place where one woman serves as the only public defender, paralegal, and
secretary in the office. 2 Finally, picture yourself as an indigent person
assigned counsel for a crime that could potentially carry a life sentence,
you meet the attorney assigned to you and learn that they don’t even
practice criminal law 3; it’s probably not long before the panic sets in.
Unfortunately, these places are not hypotheticals, they are painful realities
plaguing the parishes of Louisiana. Each story exposes a concerning
reality of the Louisiana criminal defense system, each parroting the same
basic premise: public defenders are overworked and underpaid and that
spells disaster for the quality of their work product.
The examples highlighted above show that relatively rural 4 and more
urban areas 5 each face challenges. Even Orleans Parish, Louisiana’s most
populous parish has dealt with budgetary and manpower issues. In 2012
the Louisiana Public Defender Board (LPDB) commissioned a report
documenting the problems faced by the Orleans Public Defenders Office
(OPDO). 6 This funding problem persists, and it has led to public defense
offices acting as revolving doors for young attorneys. If the Constitution
and his father Sean who have each been inspirations to him and who he misses
dearly.
1. Julie O’Donoghue, Louisiana Public Defenders Expect to Need at Least
$4 Million More in Funding, LOUISIANA ILLUMINATOR (Mar. 23, 2021),
http://www.louisianaweekly.com/louisianas-public-defender-system-will-stayin-place/ [https://perma.cc/5H97-WZWE].
2. Eli Hager, When There’s Only One Public Defender in Town, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016
/09/09/what-happens-when-there-s-only-one-public-defender [https://perma.cc/2
JK7-KJDH].
3. Eli Hager, Louisiana Public Defenders: A Lawyer with a Pulse Will Do,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep
/08/louisiana-public-defender-crisis [https://perma.cc/GCH6-LVVE].
4. Hager, supra note 2, refers to East Feliciana Parish which, as of 2019,
was estimated by the Census to have a population of around 19,000 people;
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/eastfelicianaparishlouisiana/PST04
5219 [https://perma.cc/6CT7-8LS3].
5. Hager, supra note 3, refers to Caddo Parish which as of 2019 was
estimated by the Census to have a population of around 240,000 people;
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/caddoparishlouisiana
[https://perma.cc/RV7E-5CVH].
6. Ernie Lewis & Dan Goyette, Report on the Evaluation of the Office of the
Orleans Public Defenders, LA. PUB. DEFENDER BD. (July 2012), http://lpdb.la
.gov/Serving%20The%20Public/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/Report%20on%20the%20E
valuation%20of%20the%20Office%20of%20the%20Orleans%20Public%20Def
enders.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AXF-FWQH].
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and the interests of justice were taken seriously, funding would be more
than adequate and concerns over staff retention would cease. The sad truth
is public defenders often work with lackluster resources which leads to
lackluster representation for indigent defendants in Louisiana.
This disadvantage for indigent defendants is true in times of relative
prosperity and worsens during times of spontaneous disaster such as
Hurricane Katrina 7 and the COVID-19 crisis8. It is an unmistakable truth
that funding representation of indigent defendants has been an
afterthought to Louisiana Congressmen and women falling short of the
promises made by the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and the State of Louisiana in its constitution. 9
This comment will first argue that Louisiana regularly falls short of
meeting the promises of both the United States and Louisiana constitutions
by not providing for adequate counsel even during times without
spontaneous emergency. 10 Second, it will argue that the State of Louisiana
responded poorly when it came to protecting indigent populations
contained within its jails and prisons during the Hurricane Katrina and
Covid-19 crises. These poor responses meant that access to representation
for some was even more sparse than in times of relative prosperity. Finally,
this comment will argue that there are ways in which the State of Louisiana
and the federal government can fix the system, such as giving the public
at large a stake in electing head public defenders, lobbying the federal
government to provide funding for Gideon’s promise 11 and legalizing
recreational marijuana as many other states have done to cut the
incarceration rates of low-level drug offenders and benefit from significant
tax revenues.
This Comment falls into two parts. First, Part 1 discusses the historical
and legal background behind indigent defense provision in both the United
States and Louisiana. Second, Part I will discuss the potential models for
indigent defense provision and the status of funding for public defenders
throughout the state. Third, Part I will explain Louisiana state law, both
7. See generally, Daniel Kotler, Private: Indigent Defense Washed Away by
Katrina, EXPERT FORUM: LAW AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Oct. 20, 2006),
https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/indigent-defense-washed-away-by-katrina/
[https://perma.cc/CYY4-R8GC].
8. See generally Jacquelin DeRobertis, Public Defenders Face Funding
Crisis for Sixth Year in a Row, Report Says, THE ADVOCATE (Feb. 1, 2020),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_8387cd38-453111ea-a791-d7d207a19e71.html [https://perma.cc/6ZKG-WYF8].
9. LA. CONST. art. 1 §13.
10. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789-90 (La. 1993).
11. As the right to an attorney has been colloquially termed.
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statutory and jurisprudential, surrounding the subject. Fourth, Part I
discusses Louisiana’s response to spontaneous emergencies and the ways
those emergencies have affected both the people who need representation
and those who represent them. Finally, Part I discusses the disparate
resources available to public defenders when compared to their
prosecutorial counterparts.
Part II envisions a future in which Louisiana remedies its history of
insufficient public defense provision. First, Part II will describe British
attitudes toward criminal defense, and how those attitudes may be
replicated by implementing elections of head public defenders. Second,
Part II will suggest lobbying the federal government to fulfill its moral
obligation to assist in funding. Finally, Part II will explain how marijuana
can become Louisiana’s next cash crop, perhaps lucrative enough to fully
fund Louisiana’s criminal defense system.
I: INDIGENT DEFENSE PROVISION: PAST AND PRESENT
The status of state-funded indigent defense in Louisiana has been
everchanging since its inception. This section will explain how Louisiana
went from its early days as a member of the Union, where there was no
state-provided criminal defense, to its modern model of state criminal
defense provision. It will review the potential models for providing
criminal defense, evaluate the state and federal requirements for doing so,
and determine whether the current system is as effective as it can be.
A. Historical Perspective:
From the Sixth Amendment to Strickland v. Washington 12, what it
means to have competent counsel, and what a right to counsel looks like
has changed overtime. That progression for the most part has been toward
increased rights of the accused, yet jurisprudence has not totally solved the
problem of indigent defense. This subsection shows that present
jurisprudential standards are a step in the right direction, but those
standards still burden defendants with proving their counsel’s performance
was insufficient.
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution13 contains a variety of
protections afforded to those who have been accused of a crime. Such
protections include, but are not limited to, a “speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
12. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
13. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI.
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committed . . . [and] to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”14
The 14th Amendment extended these protections to the states via the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 15 Louisiana itself provides for similar
protections in its own Constitution, a clear sign that at least through
rhetoric, the state takes seriously the rights afforded to those accused of a
crime. 16 These constitutional guarantees have created general
requirements enforced mainly through a Due Process Clause analysis.
In Powell v. Alabama17, the United States Supreme Court first
explored what it means to have competent counsel. In that case, the Court
determined that Due Process requires adequate time to prepare a case with
counsel. 18 Johnson v. Zerbst19 extended this right to counsel from capital
punishment cases exclusively, to any criminal charges levied against a
person in federal courts. 20 The right to counsel hit a bump in the road when
the court decided in Betts v. Brady21 that the right did not extend through
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to state courts. 22 However,
less than twenty years later, the court (quite rightly) overturned Betts in
Gideon v. Wainwright. 23 As the seminal case in ‘right to counsel’
jurisprudence, Gideon proclaimed that the provision of counsel was an
absolute right, because even the most learned amongst non-lawyers are
still not privy to the rules of the court and without representation, risk
being sentenced for crimes they were otherwise innocent of committing.24
As the majority opinion in Strickland v. Washington 25 points out,
simply having a lawyer present is not enough. 26 While in its dicta
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
16. LA. CONST. art. 1 § 13 (providing for explanation of the reason for
detention and assistance of counsel at each stage of a criminal proceeding.).
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
18. Id. at 71.
19. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
20. Id. at 469.
21. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
22. Id. at 473.
23. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
24. Id. at 345.
25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
26. Id. at 685 (“That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial
alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional
command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel
because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by
an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure
that the trial is fair.”).
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Strickland touts the necessity of experienced and dedicated counsel, it sets
forth a steep test for those who wish to challenge the performance of a
defense attorney. 27 The two pronged test requires both a showing of
deficiency on the part of the attorney, and a showing that the deficiency
resulted in prejudice that changed the outcome of the case. 28 This test
measures performance based on “reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms,” but those norms serve only as guides and not as hard
and fast rules. 29 In practice, this has sometimes meant that uninspiring
performances are upheld as reasonable because judges are given
significant discretionary power when making these determinations. 30
It is exceedingly difficult for many defendants to show that there case
would have reached a different outcome had the supposed inaction not
occurred. 31 It does not help that there is a “strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” 32 Though it should be noted that the Supreme Court is
increasingly influenced by ABA standards in making these reasonableness
determinations, which have resulted in more compelling defense
performances and lessened the number of ineffective counsel claims. 33

27. Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel in Times of Budgetary Crisis, MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 347 (2010).
28. Id.
29. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984); Robert R. Rigg, The
T-Rex without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77, 82 (2007).
30. Id; See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalizing of Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1447 (1999). Detailing a case in which a defense
attorney was found to have provided effective assistance of counsel while
showing signs of sleeping during trial.
31. State v. Taylor, 18-126 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/18), 258 So. 3d 217, 220.
Defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed despite
receiving 25 years for heroine distribution when his defense attorney did not file
a motion to reconsider because the sentence was within the statutory limits, the
same trial judge would have reviewed the sentence and likely would not have
deviated, and courts routinely check such sentences regardless of a formal motion;
State v. Parks, 07-655 (La. App. 5 Cir. 01/22/08), 977 So. 2d 1015, 1027
(Ineffective assistance of counsel claim was denied despite defense counsel’s
failure to object to or question a forensic scientist on the discrepancy in
descriptions of a cocaine filled vessel and on the chain of custody.).
32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
33. Id. at 97-98.
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B. Types of indigent defense models:
State funded public defense can and does take several forms. To
understand indigent defense standards and why indigent defense is so hard
for states like Louisiana to get right, it helps to understand how indigent
defense is provided.
Throughout the United States, jurisdictions use three models for
indigent defense provision: the public defender model, the contract
counsel model, and the assigned counsel model. 34 The public defender
model centers on a designated group of lawyers whose full-time duties are
to serve indigent defendants. 35 These offices act like law firms focused
solely on defense of indigent persons. Contract counsel models retain
private attorneys to counsel a specific number of cases each year in which
they are paid per case or via a lump sum. 36Assigned counsel models, on
the other hand, retain private attorneys on an as needed basis, in which
they are compensated hourly or by case. 37
Public defenders offices are most useful in large urban areas where
massive population centers create larger demands for criminal legal
services. 38 For more sparsely populated areas however, the assigned
counsel or contract counsel models appear more useful because retaining
full-time public defenders can be incredibly financially burdensome. 39 In
Louisiana there is a mix of both full-time public defender offices and
contracted practitioners who take conflicts of interest cases. 40 Conflicts of
interest often arise when public defense offices are asked to defend
multiple defendants accused of the same crime, or crimes arising out of
the same fact pattern. 41

34. Baxter, supra note 27 at 349.
35. Id.
36. Id, at 350.
37. Id.
38. Michael S. Woodruff, The Excessive Bail Clause: Achieving Pretrial
Justice Reform Through Incorporation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 297 (2014).
39. Id.
40. Nicholas Chrastil, With Increased City Funding, Public Defenders Avoid
Worst Possible Outcome,’ but Not out of the Woods Yet, New Orleans’ Chief
Defender Says (Nov. 30, 2020), http://www.louisianaweekly.com/with-increased
-city-funding-public-defenders-avoid-worst-possible-outcome-but-not-out-of-the
-woods-yet-new-orleans-chief-defender-says/ [https://perma.cc/7WZ9-J89T].
41. § 32:15. Conflicts of interest, 1 Criminal Trial Techniques.
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C. State Law and Jurisprudence
With a historical framework of indigent defense in America and an
understanding of the models used to implement indigent defense, this
section develops Louisiana’s own historical framework. This framework
shows Louisiana’s failed response to Gideon, its decision to fund indigent
defense through traffic tickets, and attempts to fix these shortcomings.
It wasn’t until 1966, three years after Gideon v. Wainwright42 was
decided, that Louisiana finally enacted an indigent defense provision
mechanism funded by a new tax provision on criminal convictions. 43 The
initial indigent defense system was purportedly improved upon when the
State of Louisiana added traffic ticket fines to the sources of income used
to provide public defense in 1974. 44 Despite providing a new revenue
source, this new law was problematic for the State of Louisiana as there
was an inherent disparity between parishes when it came to funding, and
the stream of funding was apt to fluctuate. 45
Louisiana has a total of 42 judicial districts, 13 of those 42 have little
if any access to interstate highway systems. 46 The majority of each judicial
district’s funding comes from the district itself in the form of these traffic
tickets and other fees assessed upon criminal convictions, any state
funding received acts as a modest supplement. 47 The traffic ticket funding
model is not for use solely by public defenders, local district attorneys and
sheriffs are each respectively given 12% of each traffic ticket paid. . 48
Almost one fourth of the potential funds are allocated before public
defenders can take their cut. 49
This system has served as a financial nightmare and presents a serious
ethical problem. Use of criminal conviction fines and fees to fund indigent
42. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
43. Austin N. Priddy, Rethinking Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 89 TUL. L.
REV. 491,496 (2014).
44. Id. at 497; Louisiana DAs Use Diversion Traffic Tickets to 'Openly
Violate' Ethics Laws, Complaint Says, THE ADVOCATE (June 19, 2018),
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_c8c42824-73e1-11e8-b
b06-0be0227bfe0f.html [https://perma.cc/U49V-CQ7A] (Louisiana’s reliance on
traffic tickets in recent years has made it the only state so reliant as it has proven
to be a problematic funding source.).
45. Id. at 498.
46. Mary Grace Richardson, “License, Registration, and State Funding,
Please”: Overhauling Louisiana’s Traffic-Ticket Funding Scheme of Public
Defenders, 79 LA. L. REV. 590, 597 (2019).
47. Id. at 596.
48. LA. REV. STAT. § 15:571.11 (2018).
49. Id.
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defense is sometimes referred to as a “users pay” system, emphasizing the
fact that those who are charged, and ultimately convicted, are the people
who primarily fund the criminal defense system. 50 This is a concerning
thought since indigent defendants are, by definition, those who are least
capable of paying. Having to pay simple court fines can cause additional
legal and civil rights issues as those who are poor can end up spending
more time in jail because of their inability to pay, thus creating a vicious
cycle. 51
In State v. Peart, a public defender based in New Orleans had an
overwhelming caseload of over 400 clients during a seven month period.52
400 clients is far and above the suggested limitations within one year’s
time let alone a seven month period. 53 He petitioned for relief, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately found that the state’s provision of
public defense was inadequate, but denied the trial court’s decision which
would have ordered the legislature to provide additional funding. 54 The
Louisiana Supreme Court felt that making such an order would overstep
its constitutional mandate and muddle in the function of the legislature.55
Later, in State v. Covington, the Court held that ineffective assistance of
counsel must be determined on a case by case basis, thus reinstating the
district court level opinion that issues related to chronic underfunding can
only be dealt with by the state’s legislature. 56 In the case of State v.
Wigley 57, the Louisiana Supreme Court denounced the practice of cost
50. Public Defenders Should Not Be Forced to Rely on Fines and Fees, LA.
BUDGET PROJECT (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.labudget.org/2020/02/publicdefenders-should-not-be-forced-to-rely-on-fines-and-fees/
[https://perma.cc/T3VB-595U].
51. Id; Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: CashRegister Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2016).
(Describing the cyclical effect various criminal justice fees have on people being
locked up or threatened with larger fines/fees because of the inability to pay.).
52. Malia Brink, Still Underwater: Louisiana’s Public Defense System in
Crisis 32 CRIM. JUST. 45, 45 (2017-18).
53. American Council of Chief Defenders Statement on Caseloads and
Workloads, American Council of Chief Defenders (Aug. 24, 2007), https://jjie
.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/ls_sclaid_def_train_caseloads_standards_ethics
_opinions_combined.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5U5-EYDC].
54. State v. Peart, 92-0907 (La. 1993), 621 So. 2d 780, 791-92.
55. Id.
56. State v. Peart, 92-0907 (La. 1993), 621 So.2d 780, 783; State v.
Covington, 2020-00447, 9, (La. Dec. 11, 2020).
57. State v. Wigley, 92-1503 (La. 1993), 624 So. 2d 425, 429 (‘to require that
attorneys represent indigents with no recompense while bearing the expenses of
the representation, when the attorneys must maintain their own practices and
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cutting on capital defense by appointing private defense counselors
without pay. 58 Just as indigent defendants have a right to counsel, the
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmatively stated that those who perform
indigent defense work have a right to compensation for their work, at least
in the form of expenses incurred. 59
Issues within the Louisiana criminal justice system and with public
defense came to a head during Hurricane Katrina. 60 Indigent defendants,
most of whom were charged with minor crimes, faced poor housing
conditions within Orleans Parish jails and prisons amidst the crisis.61
Hurricane Katrina was a catalyst for change, prompting the state to create
the Louisiana Public Defender Board whose main purpose was to enforce
“statewide performance standards and administer the state indigent
defense fund.” 62 This system has tried to centralize the process of Public
Defense and elevate standards while improving planning, hiring, and
training processes. 63 Another essential function of the Board is its ability
to hire and fire head public defenders in each judicial district. 64
D. The Impact of Natural and Man-Made Disasters on the Problem
The provision of indigent defense in Louisiana is imperfectly funded.
This funding mechanism is not enough for normal conditions in the state,
and the problem is exacerbated when unforeseen tragedies occur, whether
they be health disasters like COVID-19 or man-made disasters such as
continue to meet their other professional and financial obligations in today's
changed legal marketplace, "is so onerous that it constitutes an abusive extension
of their professional obligations."’ . . . "the profession must be relieved of this
burden and . . . the burden must pass to the citizens."’).
58. Cohen, Ben, Calvin Johnson, & William P. Quigley. "An Analysis of the
Economic Cost of Maintaining a Capital Punishment System in the Pelican State",
21 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 28 (2019).
59. State v. Wigley, 624 So. 2d 425, 428 (La. 1993).
60. A Report on Pre- and Post- Katrina Indigent Defense in New Orleans, S.
CTR. FOR HUM. RIGHTS (Mar. 2006), 15-16 (discussing the decrease in funding,
and a staggering number of attorney layoffs which resulted) https://www
.schr.org/files/post/katrina%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3WU-8W34].
61. Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The
Constitution After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 128 (2006).
62. Richard Drew, Louisiana's New Public Defender System: Origins, Main
Features, and Prospects for Success, 69 LA . L. REV. 955, 955 (2009).
63. Brink, supra note 52 at 46; What We Do, LA. PUB. DEFENDER BD
http://lpdb.la.gov/About/What%20We%20Do.php [https://perma.cc/JMQ6-ND
MP] (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
64. Drew, supra note 62 at 976.
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shootings. The 2016 shooting of officers and catastrophic flooding in
Baton Rouge led to a decrease in the number of traffic citations and thus
lessened the indigent defense funding available. 65 Since law enforcement
shifted its concern towards public safety instead of more menial matters
like traffic citations, public defense funding ultimately suffered. 66 The
Louisiana Public Defense Board was thereafter forced to divert funds that
were meant to go to other parishes, towards East Baton Rouge. 67
In February of 2020, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic,
eight of the 42 public defenders offices in the state were listed as being in
‘restriction of services,’ 68 meaning they were limited in their abilities to
adequately represent indigent clients. The designation signals an attempt
to match expenditures with revenues and to assure attorneys are fulfilling
their ethical duties to clients. As of March 2021, that number had risen to
13 of the 42 judicial districts being under the ‘restriction of services’
designation. 69 Yet during the pandemic, public defenders took on an
additional role, acting as liaisons between incarcerated persons and their
loved ones. 70 During the pandemic, those who were incarcerated faced
limits on their ability to communicate with the outside world, 30 minutes
of free communication each week, and in some instances only by phone
call or E-mail. 71 Because of the uncertainty during this time, it is easy to
65. DeRobertis, supra note 8.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Louisiana Judicial Districts Under Restriction of Services, LA. STATE
BAR ASS’N, https://www.lsba.org/CJC/CJCOverview.aspx [https://perma.cc/R
NR4-J4GY], (last viewed March 19, 2021).
70. Id.
71. https://doc.louisiana.gov/imprisoned-person-programsresources/offender-information/ [https://perma.cc/G5W8-85SK] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2021) (The Louisiana prison system prepared to phase in in-person
visitations on March 13, 2021.) (The prison system website only mentions
telephone and E-mail communication methods, not video-calling); Avi AsherSchapiro, Locked up during COVID-19: Costly phone calls strain families,
REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-prisons-tech/locked-up-duringcovid-19-costly-phone-calls-strain-families-idUSKCN26E3DQ
[https://perma.cc/8A6Z-YNCV] (Stating that inmates are given 30 minutes of free
phone time per week); Inmate Visitation Rules, JEFFERSON PARISH SHERIFF’S
OFFICE, https://jpso.com/272/Inmate-Visitation-Rules [https://perma.cc/E6FB9VNK] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021), (At this jail, in person visitations were
discontinued as of 2017, giving way to video calling only); ‘Visitation’, Orleans
Parish Sheriff’s Office, https://www.opso.us/index.php?option=com_con
tent&view=article&id=379&Itemid=794 [https://perma.cc/2D8P-ZTY2] (last
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imagine the added stress this restricted communication created for those
involved. 72
While public defenders continued to work for and support those
charged with crimes, they themselves faced the ever looming threat of
lowered pay, or layoffs. 73 Two outcomes came of these layoffs, public
defenders continued to represent their clients without compensation (an
uncommon sight), or hundreds perhaps thousands were at least
temporarily left without representation.74 Without proper representation,
issues like unnecessary plea bargaining could arise and inmates could
ultimately be left without advocates to monitor their conditions in jail or
prison.
Beyond the immediacy of the pandemic, these conditions created
concerns for the longer lasting effects of the pandemic on public defenders
and their role in the system. Cases like Powell, show us that a trial cannot
commence for an indigent defendant if there is no counsel to assist a
client. 75 The speedy trial provisions could not be masked by a pandemic
at that point, they would have to be addressed, otherwise the state is left
with a problem of violating constitutional and state provisions and setting
itself up for a low-quality justice system and perhaps a bevy of lawsuits.
E. The Disparate Current Status of Criminal Justice Funding
It has oftentimes been stated that funding for indigent defense in
Louisiana is inadequate. This subsection shows how that inadequacy
translates to staffing problems in public defender offices. This subsection
will also compare the difference in resources available to public defenders
and prosecutors.

visited Mar. 15, 2021), in person visitation was suspended; however, attorneys
were allowed to utilize the onsite Video Visitation Center.
72. Chrastil, supra note 40.
73. See generally, Matt Sledge, New Orleans Public Defenders Announce
Furloughs as Officials Project $800,000 Shortfall, NOLA.COM (Apr. 20, 2020 at
5:51 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/coronavirus/article_54f5513c-8359-11ea9fc2-b3099eaae489.html [https://perma.cc/EMA2-ZGT2]; Debra Weiss, Public
Defenders in this State are Told to Slash Budgets as Traffic-Ticket Funding
Plummets, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 9, 2020 at 2:53 PM), https://www.abajour
nal.com/news/article/public-defenders-are-told-to-slash-budgets-as-traffic-ticket
-funding-plummets [https://perma.cc/ML5Y-XPE7].
74. Weiss, supra note 73.
75. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
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Louisiana currently only employs one fifth the number of public
defenders suggested by American Bar Association’s standards. 76 Despite
an ongoing staffing problem, the state public defense offices still managed
to see an alarming 40 person drop in full-time equivalent attorneys
between 2014 and 2016. 77 That 40 person drop was significant for a
workforce which began with only 403 attorney, 78and should have been
closer to 1,700 according to ABA standards. 79 The issue is and primarily
has been the model of funding, fees gathered from traffic violations are
simply inadequate and cannot support the need for indigent criminal
defense in Louisiana. 80 Funds raised from traffic fines stay in each district
and state money acts only as a supplemental fund.81 What this ultimately
means is that those judicial districts with access to the interstate highway
system have a distinct advantage in the revenue game over those in more
rural districts who rely on whatever supplemental funds they are
allocated. 82
There is a natural comparison between the resources available to those
at the public defenders’ offices and those at the district attorneys’ offices
in the state. Part of the reason this funding conversation matters is because
of the clear disparity that exists between prosecutorial spending and
spending by public defenders. There has been a relatively small change in
public defense expenditure compared to six years earlier. In 2013, public
defenders had a total of $65,397,129 in total expenditures, and by 2019,
that amount had only increased to $69,391,794. 83 In 2013, there was a
76. Id.
77. Postlethwaite & Netterville, APAC and the American Bar Association
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, The Louisiana
Project: A Study of the Louisiana Defender System and Attorney Workload
Standards (Feb. 2017). https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/admin
istrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_louisiana_project_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EDK7-QYC3].
78. Id.
79. Hager, supra note 2.
80. Malia Brink, Still Underwater: Louisiana’s Public Defense System in
Crisis, 32 CRIM. JUST. 45, 46 (2017-18).
81. Richard Drew, Louisiana’s New Public Defender System: Origins, Main
Features, and Prospects for Success, 69 LA. L. REV. 955, 977 (2009).
82. Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, THE ATLANTIC (June 2, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485165/
[https://perma.cc/79ZM-6N5F].
83. A Review of Public Defense Funding in Louisiana, LA. STATE BAR ASS’N
(Aug. 2013), https://www.lsba.org/documents/CJC/PublicDefenderFundingPP
.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FUV-UKQK]; Louisiana Public Defender Board 2019
Annual Report, LA. PUB. DEFENDER BD. (Jan. 2019), http://lpdb.la.gov/
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spending rate of $2.14 dollars by district attorneys’ offices for every public
defendant dollar, yet 85% of all criminal cases are taken by public
defenders. 84 More recent numbers could not be found, but there is no
indication that prosecutorial spending has significantly waned. That $2.14
dollar figure doesn’t even take into consideration the police resources and
expenditures available to district attorneys. An overbearing workload in
combination with a sheer lack of funds makes for a losing battle from the
get-go.
A contributing factor to the budgetary problems previously explained
is the negative public perception of indigent defendants and their public
defenders. Politicians in the past realized there is more political clout in
voting for increased compensation and funding for public servants who do
not defend criminals. 85 Attitudes have changed and now two-thirds of the
American voting public believe government money should be used to fund
indigent defense. 86 Louisiana needs to capitalize on this shift in public
perception of indigent defense and apply appropriate funding.
II: CHANGING MINDSETS AND FINDING SOLUTIONS
Scholarship, anecdotal evidence, and empirical evidence all seem to
show that an underfunded and overworked public defense system is a net
negative for Louisiana. Innocent people plead guilty or are wrongly
convicted, money is wasted, and constitutional guarantees are not
adequately fulfilled. Louisiana must start looking outward to systems that
have garnered higher levels of success and try to replicate their attitudes
and processes. A system cannot be fixed without change, the key is
determining what must be changed and how best to effectuate that change.
The British system of justice served as a template for America’s
system; as such, present day Britain can offer critical ideals related to
indigent defense which Louisiana should strive to replicate. This section
will explain how to apply these ideals in a distinctively Louisianan and
American style by making Head Public Defenders elected positions and
creating a federal stake in indigent defense funding. This section will also
explore the various benefits that could come from legalizing marijuana.
Serving%20The%20Public/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/2019%20LPDB%20Annual%20
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PQP-WU8D].
84. Id.
85. Baxter, supra note 27 at 355.
86. Bryan Furst, A Fair Fight: Achieving Indigent Defense Resource Parity,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/publications/2019_09_Defender%20Parity%20AnalysisV7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/55LA-NP44].

2022]

COMMENT

107

A. Thinking like the British: Their attitudes towards Indigent Defense
England has always served as a model for American culture,
government, and legal structure. This subsection shows how England’s
attitude towards indigent defense in the modern day is a valuable model
for fixing the problems Louisiana faces.
In 1949, fourteen years before Gideon v. Wainwright was decided in
the United States, British Parliament passed the Legal Advice and
Assistance Act which provided criminal defense representation to anyone
who had insufficient means or in situations where the court felt it was in
the interest of justice.87 The British people and their government approach
indigent defense differently than the United States. In Britain, the indigent
defense system is highly respected, and prosecution and defense have
more parity. 88 A report comparing the cost of legal aid in criminal and civil
trials, commissioned by the British Government during the mid to late
1990’s suggested that “defendants must "receive a fair hearing" and the
defense must be "on an equal footing with the prosecution."89 Britain took
those values to heart and has a demand-led system where the government
has a duty to provide funding as needed in a particular year. 90
Britain feels international pressures, as does the United States, but
because of state sovereignty, individual states have sometimes chosen to
ignore these pressures. Particularly, the British are influenced by the
European Court on Human Rights, its founding treaty the European
Convention on Human Rights ‘provides that a person has a right to "legal
assistance" to defend himself and "to be given it free when the interests of
justice so require."’ 91 This is not to say that Britain’s exact model is what
is needed in the State of Louisiana, but that its basic ideas towards indigent
defense would be a marked improvement from the state’s current attitude.

87. Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England
and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 862 (2004).
88. U.S. Department of Justice Report; Expert Working Group Report:
International Perspectives on Indigent Defense, 13, (September 2011).
89. Lefstein, supra note 87 at 867.
90. Id. at 870.
91. Id. at 871.
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B. Achieving a British level of engagement and giving the people a stake
in public defender accountability
Analysis of the British attitude towards indigent defense is only
valuable if those attitudes and initiatives are replicated in some fashion.
This subsection describes how to go about putting head public defenders
and prosecutors on a level playing field. Specifically, having publicly
elected head public defenders in each judicial district similar to that of
judges and district attorneys in the State of Louisiana.
Unlike their district attorney counterparts, head public defenders in
Louisiana are not elected, but rather, appointed by the Louisiana Public
Defender Board. 92 The idea of more elected positions may seem a dubious
proposition. Americans have long had mistrust and distaste for the
performances of certain popularly elected institutions, such as Congress,
at the national level.93 But, Americans are more engaged with local
representatives. Based on this engagement, many Americans see local
officials as honest and caring individuals who are receptive to their
concerns. 94 Allowing elections of public defenders could change
perceptions and allow citizens to feel a closer connection with these
defenders and the work they do.
There is a problem with the fact that judges, district attorneys, and
head public defenders are treated differently. The former positions are
elected while the latter is not. The main reason prosecutors are elected is
because they are endowed with so much power. Prosecutors are the
primary decision makers in using state resources and applying state
criminal laws, and they accept broad mandates that allow ample
discretion. 95 At the state level, America began seeing elected judges early
after the country’s founding. 96 The call for the election of judges arose
92. Louisiana Governmental Auditor Guide, LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR (Oct. 20,
2020),
https://www.lla.la.gov/lagag.nsf/bdcb79123307274c8625813000748590/42e6a4
59492e1d76862580d4005358e6?OpenDocument#:~:text=District%20attorneys
%20receive%2012%25%20of,various%20other%20local%20government%20ag
encies [https://perma.cc/CRJ5-99TP].
93. JOHN GRAY GREER, BUT, I., AND MARK TWAIN. "ELECTED OFFICIALS."
PUBLIC OPINION AND POLLING AROUND THE WORLD: A HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 1 (2004): 220, 224.
94. Id.
95. Ronald F. Wright, Public Defender Elections and Popular Control Over
Criminal Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 803, 806 (2010).
96. Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges--An Historical Introduction, 44
TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (1966).
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more out of a populist belief in exercise of the people’s will than out of
any particular logic for electing such officials. Perhaps the elections of
public defenders can serve a different purpose, such as creating a public
stake in the selection process and generating discourse about the position
and its role in the community. Instead of the current system where an
unelected state board controls appointment and dismissal, the people could
decide on a cyclical basis.
An election cycle can cause candidates to have substantive debates
about the goals of the office. 97 Thankfully, other states have implemented
elections of head public defenders, and Louisiana can learn from these
systems while avoiding their pitfalls. For example, when elections were
subject to partisan voting, there were instances where single parties would
dominate each cycle and virtually disenfranchise groups through the
primary voting process. 98 Accordingly, Florida proposed to enact a bill
that made such elections non-partisan. 99 Creating non-partisan elections
gives the entire community a voice in the debate on public defense priority
regardless of political affiliation, recentering the discussion around ideas
and not identity. The purpose of instituting elections is to give the people
(all people) a voice in setting the priorities for the criminal justice system.
C. Federal Funding of the Unfunded Mandate
Funding is the central theme in the indigent defense dilemma. Funding
determines the longevity and motivation of individual public defenders,
the number of public defenders, and the resources available to mount each
defense. This subsection contemplates federal participation in funding the
previously unfunded mandate.
An unfunded mandate is “an obligation that a government or agency
perform some task that is required by a superior government or legislature
but for which funding is not provided.”100 Though this term tends to be
used in relation to legislative actions, it may apply in this context as well.
While the promise of appointed counsel is an affirmative right, it is largely
unfunded by the federal government. 101 State police funding is not an
97. Wright, supra note 95 at 818.
98. Id.
99. Andrew Pantazi, Should Florida Prosecutors and Public Defenders Have
Political Parties?, THE FLA. TIMES UNION (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.jackson
ville.com/news/2017-01-18/should-florida-prosecutors-and-public-defenders-ha
ve-political-parties [https://perma.cc/334H-M7Y9].
100. Unfunded Mandate, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY
DESK EDITION (2012).
101. Furst, supra note 86.
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enumerated right under the Constitution, 102 yet police agencies receive a
notable amount of funding from federal programs while public defense
organizations currently do not. 103 For example, the Edward Byrne
Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program is the leading program
for federal criminal justice funding to the states. 104 That program allows
for a variety of criminal justice funding purposes, but does not mention
support of public defense entities as one of those purposes. 105 In Louisiana
alone, several state and parish law enforcement organizations utilized this
program to receive several million dollars in supplemental funding to state
and parish allocations in 2019, 106 all while the Louisiana state budget
utterly lacked any federal funding allocations for public defense. 107
Unfortunately, funding programs and federal legislation addressing
the struggles of funding and supporting state indigent defense
organizations are few and far between. One effort which recently
attempted to turn that tide, was the colloquially named EQUAL Defense
Act. 108 This act expressly sought to protect fair trial and due process rights
and create reasonable workload limits. 109 The EQUAL Defense Act also
102. Instead that funding and execution falls under each state’s sovereign
police powers.
103. Furst, supra note 86.
104. Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program Fact Sheet,
BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/
media/document/jag-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A5F-XA2L] (last visited
April 4, 2022).
105. Id. (Suitable purposes for this funding include: “law enforcement;
prosecution (and court; prevention and
education; corrections and community corrections; drug treatment and
enforcement; planning, evaluation,
and technology improvement; crime victim and witness initiatives; and mental
health programs and
related law enforcement and corrections programs, including behavioral programs
and crisis intervention
teams.”).
106. Awards, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, (Over the years, a total of 150
grants and $98,185,739 have been awarded.) https://bja.ojp.gov/funding/awards
/list?district=6&field_award_status_value=All&state=LA&field_funding_type_
value=All&fiscal_year=&combine_awards=&awardee=&city= [https://perma.cc
/T24V-CSH7] (last visited March 16, 2022).
107. State Budget Fiscal Year 2019-2020, https://www.doa.la.gov/media/
slcdv1eo/statebudgetfy20.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4JE-VRVW] (last visited Feb.
20, 2022).
108. S. 1377, 116th Cong. (2019).
109. Id.
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included lofty measures to fix issues of pay parity between public
defenders and prosecutors, create funding to train public defenders, and
support student loan repayment programs. 110 This bill was introduced in
the Senate by then Senator Kamala Harris, who previously worked as a
prosecutor in California. Despite coming from a prosecutorial background,
the Senator noted in an interview that the criminal justice system too often
fails to provide poor defendants a fair trial or Due Process rights.111 In
2019 this bill failed to be enacted into law, but with the new Biden
Administration, and new powers controlling the House and Senate, this act
or one just like it could reasonably become reality.
As a Constitutional mandate, the federal government should feel a
desire and a duty to assist in the funding of indigent defense. Instead,
public defense organizations are relegated to the pursuit of begging and
pleading with their states, private organizations, and what little resources
are available through the federal government. In place of these resources,
non-profit organizations such as the National Legal Aid & Defender
Association have cropped up to provide support for public defender
training and achievement. 112 The NLADA website provides a toolkit for
accessing federal funding and private contributions to supplement lacking
resources, however no such toolkit should be necessary in a world where
the federal government takes its mandate seriously and begins to fund it
adequately. 113 The State government, Louisiana Public Defenders, the
National Legal Aid & Defender Association, and individuals should put
pressure on Congress to pass a bill that helps fund and achieve adequate
public defense systems in Louisiana and other needy parts of the country.
D. Legalize Recreational Marijuana
Finally, this subsection develops the most practical way Louisiana can
generate new revenue, lessen caseloads, and fix the public defense
problem. Louisiana has a long history of socioeconomic disparity based
110. See generally, S. 1377, 116th Cong. (2019).
111. Kyung Lah, Kamala Harris to Introduce Legislation Aimed at Aiding
Public Defenders, CNN (May 8, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/
politics/kamala-harris-public-defender-bill [https://perma.cc/NZB4-QLX8].
112. About NLADA, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N,
http://www.nlada.org/about-nlada [https://perma.cc/B6VN-7Z94] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2022).
113. Accessing Federal Grants, Foundation Funds and Other Supplemental
Resources: A Toolkit for Public Defenders, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER
ASS’N (March 2020), http://www.nlada.org/sites/default/files/pictures/Accessing
%20Federal%20Grants.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM8V-MJ8Z].

112

LSU LAW JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE & POLICY

[Vol. I & II

on race partly perpetuated by the continued war on drugs. Louisiana could
take a huge step forward in various ways by legalizing recreational
marijuana.
Legalizing recreational marijuana could ameliorate a host of
socioeconomic issues that have plagued the state and the nation for
decades. From a social standpoint, marijuana legalization could turn back
the racial animus which prompted the policy and fix racial disparities in
enforcement of those policies. The name “marijuana” itself derives from
an effort to associate cannabis with Mexican immigrants.114 The negative
association that was attached to marijuana did not stop with those of
Mexican heritage, but was used for impure intentions such as oppressing
those of African, Hispanic, and Asian descent. 115 In the late 1800s and
early 1900s, advocates for the criminalization of marijuana use pointed to
marijuana as a catalyst for violent crimes such as rape and murder.116
However, empirical studies in states that have legalized medical marijuana
within the past decade or so have found notable decreases in violent crimes
and crimes generally.
Marijuana has certainly had a racially skewed impact in Louisiana, so
much so that a study released in early 2020 showed that Black people were
3.4 times more likely than their White counterparts to be arrested for
marijuana use in the state. 117 Violent crime is not what drives the excessive
prison populations in Louisiana. Instead, it is the war on drugs, specifically
through the use of mandatory minimums. Second offenses for marijuana
possession can carry minimums of six-month jail terms, while fourth
offenses can have as severe a punishment as twenty years in prison.118
There is one other statistic which raises concern when looking at the war
on drugs in Louisiana. In 2018, 51% of all drug arrests in the state were
made for marijuana possession, not distribution. 119 That fact combined
with the realization that Black people are significantly more likely to be
arrested for marijuana possession shows that Louisiana is both burdening
114. Michael Vitiello, Marijuana Legalization, Racial Disparity, and the
Hope for Reform, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789 (2019).
115. Id.
116. Steven W. Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 UC
DAVIS L. REV. 689, 690 (2016).
117. New ACLU Report: Black People Three Times More Likely to get
arrested for Marijuana in Louisiana, LA. ACLU (April 19, 2020) https://www
.laaclu.org/en/press-releases/new-aclu-report-black-people-three-times-more-likely-getarrested-marijuana-louisiana [https://perma.cc/HE8M-BJHR].

118. Courtney Harper Turkington, Louisiana's Addiction
Incarceration by the Numbers, 63 LOY. L. REV. 557, 569 (2017).
119. Supra note 117.
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its criminal defense system and propping up its penal system by attacking
Black communities for marijuana possession. If the state were to legalize
recreational marijuana, it could lift significant burdens plaguing the Black
community and create the ability of public defenders to provide
meaningful representation.
These laws are not mere abstract expressions, real people like Bernard
Noble have felt the impacts of these harsh and disproportionate mandatory
minimum rules. 120 Mr. Noble was sentenced to over thirteen years in a
Louisiana prison for possession of a relatively small amount of
marijuana. 121 Keep in mind what these mandatory minimums and
disproportionate effects on Black people in Louisiana means for the
system as a whole. In Louisiana, 85% of criminal defendants are
considered indigent, while 70% of all prison inmates are Black. 122 This
persistent fight against drugs affects mainly Black and poor persons,
causing a strain on the caseload of public defenders and squeezing the
already small budget for those public defenders.
As alluded to earlier, the positive effects of marijuana legalization are
not just critical to the black community, but to Louisiana as a whole. The
legalization of marijuana has been shown to reduce other crimes by
significant margins. Alcohol consumption, which tends to cause more
aggressive behavior, decreased as it was substituted for marijuana use in
states that have legalized the drug. 123 Researchers believe this reduction in
alcohol consumption may have contributed to the notable decrease in
levels of rape and theft. 124 The study referenced above suggests that
reduction in rates of rape and theft are both economically and
psychologically driven. 125 When marijuana becomes legal, the supply
chain reduces some of its risk associated costs, consumers increase
120. Tamar Todd, The Benefits of Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99, 108 (2018).
121. Id.
122. Stanley Augustin, Class Action Law Suit: Public Defender System
Systematically Denies Poor People the Right to an Adequate Defense, LAWYER’S
COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW (Feb. 6, 2017), https://lawyers
committee.org/class-action-lawsuit-louisianas-public-defender-system-systemat
ically-denies-poor-people-right-adequate-defense/#:~:text=Eighty%2Dfive%20
percent%20of%20people,crime%20in%20Louisiana%20are%20indigent
[https://perma.cc/CY4X-7W48].
123. Davide Dragone, et. al, Crime and the Legalization of Recreational
Marijuana, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 10522, IZA INST. OF LAB. ECONS.,
10 (2017).
124. Id. at 10-11.
125. Id. at 12.
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consumption as supply increases, and again move away from alcohol or
other drugs/substances that induce aggressive behavior. 126 Instead of
aggressive behavior, marijuana tends to produce a soothing, and euphoric
effect on the user. 127
Another benefit to marijuana legalization is the ability of the state to
exercise control over the manufacturing and distribution processes and
generate revenue. From a consumer safety standpoint, marijuana
legalization creates safe market places for consumers to purchase without
the risk of being harmed during the transaction, or by faulty product. 128 If
the state of Louisiana were to tax marijuana at both the manufacturing and
sales stages, as Colorado has done, it stands to gain substantial yields. In
Colorado, implementation of a 15% tax on manufacturers and a 10% tax
on consumers, yielded $2,000,000 of revenue in the first month alone.129
At the state level, Colorado was able to raise more than $75 million in
revenue in 2014. 130 The state, through home rule laws, allowed localities
to impose their own sales taxes which generated, if nothing else, mild
revenue boosts. 131
Through this tax provision, the states have an opportunity for
oversight, taxation, and even to serve as market participants. The Internal
Revenue Code provides for tax exemption of income derived from
essential governmental functions. 132 The IRS in turn has precedential
Revenue Rulings which found income derived from certain state
operations of liquors stores was not subject to federal taxation under §115.
133
Just as states have a legitimate interest in regulating and selling alcohol
to protect the health and safety of their citizens, minors in particular, they
also have such an interest when regulating and selling marijuana, which
likely means the essential governmental function test applies. 134 The
essential governmental function test is subject to another IRS ruling that
126. Id.
127. Id.
128
Edward M. Shepard & Paul R. Blackley, Medical Marijuana and Crime:
Further Evidence from the Western States, 462 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 122 (2006).
129. David Blake & Jack Finlaw, Marijuana Legalization in Colorado:
Learned Lessons, 8 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 359, 373 (2014).
130. Jeremy P. Gove, Colorado and Washington Got Too High: The Argument
for Lower Recreational Marijuana Excise Taxes, 19 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 67,
72 (2016).
131. Id.
132. 26 U.S. CODE § 115.
133. Benjamin M. Leff, Tax Benefits of Government-Owned Marijuana
Stores, 50 UC DAVIS L. REV. 659, 669-70 (2016).
134. Id. at 672.
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forbids both private inurement or substantial private benefit. 135 In essence,
the federal government does not allow private entities to influence or
benefit substantially under this status once it has been proved that the
entity is run by a state government entity and serves a public purpose.136
Thankfully, this shouldn’t pose much of a problem in the absence of a high
interest loan or a private interest in the state run business.137
The legalization of marijuana is a solid step in the right direction for
various reasons; however, legalization is not magic. It cannot fix all
aspects of the law enforcement struggle, economic or otherwise.
Legalization even at the state level, would consist of a serious level of
regulation, including limiting the age of consumption, the parties who can
sell, and amounts that are legal to possess.138 At the state level, most
officers do not focus solely on drug enforcement, so while efforts and
resources may be reallocated to other issues, this may not ultimately have
much of an effect on law enforcement expenses. 139
CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system, specifically indigent defense provision,
has been recognized as essential in the United States. States like Louisiana
have simply dropped the ball when it comes to providing adequate support
to indigent criminal defendants. Despite notable efforts to improve upon
the system in Louisiana, the state continues to falter. As seen in Peart and
Covington, Louisiana cannot rely on its courts to create systemic changes
to the indigent defense provision system. Instead, a push by the people and
the legislature is desperately needed.
Upon inspection of the system as a whole, three main solutions can be
implemented which can lead to lasting improvements. First, the state can
change perspectives on public defenders by instituting elections in the
same way district attorneys are elected. This solution admittedly is more
of a symbolic gesture, one that provides perspective and strengthens the
importance of public defense as an institution. Second, because indigent
defense is required by the United States Constitution, the federal
government should have a more vested interest in providing funding and
assuring that provision by each state is truly adequate. A little bit of
government funding could go a long way in supplementing the state and
135. Id. at 676-77.
136. REV. RUL. 57-128.
137. Id.
138. Sam Kamin, Colorado Marijuana Regulation Five Years Later: Have We
Learned Anything at All, 96 DENV. L. REV. 221, 238 (2019).
139. Id.
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local efforts to ensure this constitutional promise is fulfilled. Third, the
state can do as many other states have, legalize marijuana, and reap the tax
benefits that may be able to support the struggling public defense system
in the state. With this increased funding, the state of Louisiana will be able
to beef up staffing, increase resources, and provide adequate criminal
defense that meets constitutional expectations, and prevents unnecessary
plea bargaining or wrongful convictions.

